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SCIENCE GONE ASTRAY: 
EVOLUTION AND RAPE 
Elisabeth A. Lloyd* 
A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL 
COERCION. By Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 2000. Pp. xvi, 251. $28.95. 
It is clear where the opposition is coming from - it's coming from ideol­
ogy . . . . Most of the ideology is coming from certain feminist groups. It's 
not feminism, per se, that's against us. It is certain groups of feminists 
that are against the application of science for dealing with this problem. 
That is a socially very irresponsible position.1 
Throughout A Natural History of Rape, coauthors Randy 
Thomhill2 and Craig Palmer3 resort to what is known among philoso­
phers of science as "The Galileo Defense," which amounts to the fol­
lowing claim: I am telling the Truth and doing excellent science, but 
because of ideology and ignorance, I am being persecuted.4 The 
authors have repeated and elaborated upon this defense during the 
si:lable media flurry accompanying the book's publication in February 
2000.5 
* Arnold and Maxine Tanis Chair of History and Philosophy of Science and Professor 
of Biology, Indiana University, Bloomington. B.A. summa cum laude, 1980, University of 
Colorado, Boulder; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1984, Princeton. - Ed. I would like to thank Rich­
ard Dawkins, Steve Downes, Alex Klein, Michael Wade, and Rasmus Winther for their use­
ful comments on earlier drafts of this Review. 
1. Interview by Mike Dano with Randy Thornhill (Feb. 4, 2000), in Daily Lobo (U. New 
Mexico). 
2. Regents' Professor and Professor of Biology, University of New Mexico. 
3. Instructor of Anthropology, University of Colorado. 
4. Thornhill and Palmer write: 
Why have researchers attempting to discover the evolutionary causes of rape been denied 
positions at universities? Why have organizers of scholarly conferences attempted to keep 
papers on evolutionary analysis of rape from being presented? Why have editors of scholarly 
journals refused to publish papers treating rape in a Darwinian perspective? 
P. 105. And later: "The choice between the social science explanation's answers and the 
evolutionarily informed answers provided in this book is essentially a choice between ideol­
ogy and knowledge." P. 189. 
5. "In the future; I anticipate, hopefully not the too distant future, that we'll turn this 
thing around in a sense t�at people will look back with horror at the kinds of attitudes that 
Brownmiller is expressing today and, to a degree, Dr. Coyne. And the horror will be in the 
fact that people did not understand that, in the Dark Ages, the validity and importance of 
1536 
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Now, history has accepted this defense from Galileo. But in order 
for it to work for Thornhill and Palmer, of course, they must be telling 
the Truth and doing excellent science. In this Review I shall argue that 
the Galileo defense is impotent in the hands of Thornhill and Palmer 
because of glaring flaws in their science. 
I. THEIR CLAIMS 
Thornhill and Palmer present two alternative evolutionary expla­
nations for the existence of human rape. They claim that rape behav­
ior must either have evolved through a process of natural selection -
that it must be a specific adaptation - or it must be the byproduct of 
some underlying traits which must themselves be adaptations. 
Their main arguments for these theses all rest on a hypothesis 
about the evolution of sex differences: that because women bear the 
brunt of the effort in reproduction - through pregnancy, nursing, and 
infant care - they have evolved to be very selective about their mates. 
Men, on the other hand, by virtue of the possibility of being able to 
reproduce with the minimal investment of mere ejaculation, have 
evolved to seek out as many mates as possible, and to copulate with no 
intention of co-parenting or providing. This has led to such traits of 
male sexuality as the desire for casual sex, the seeking out of a wide 
variety of mates, and a stronger disregard for the particular features of 
a given mate. Hence, female and male "reproductive strategies" differ: 
women choose mates carefully, whereas men seek multiple mates.6. 
Here is how each of Thornhill and Palmer's two theses about rape 
relies on this picture of evolved male sexuality. They call their first hy­
pothesis - that men have evolved, through natural selection, a spe­
cific tendency toward rape behavior - the "rape-specific" hypothesis. 
On this view, men who had trouble attaining sexual access to females 
- especially because of low status or evidence of inferior genetic 
make-up - must have resorted to rape in order to satisfy their sexual 
urges to mate with a larger number of women. Thi�. trait, a disposition 
to rape behavior, helped get these males' genes into the human gene 
pool by increasing mate number, and thereby increasing the frequency 
of "rape genes" in the population, through the process of natural se­
lection. In other words, the reproductive problems facing our human 
ancestors were very specific, and thus the mechanism that "solved" 
science for correcting our social problems. But specifically in response to the kind of data 
that we have in there, it's all scientific approach .... " Talk of the Nation (Nat'! Public Radio, 
Jan. 26, 2000) (comments of Randy Thornhill); see also Erica Goode, What Provokes a Rap­
ist to Rape?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2000, at B9; Scott Sandliri, Rape; a Biological Act, UNM 
Professor Writes , ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 22, 2000, at Al; Lawrence Spohn, Balance of 
Power, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 14, 2000, at A2. ' 
6. This is a standard view among many biologists working on human and animal evolu­
tion. 
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these problems - i.e., the tendency to rape itself - is also specific. 
Therefore, the rape-specific adaptation hypothesis is favored. 
Evolution by natural selection occurs when individuals of one type 
of genetic makeup (genotype) reproduce more successfully than indi­
viduals of other types of genetic makeup, resulting in a change within 
the whole population of the proportions of each type. In order for 
natural selection to work in favor of a particular genotype, the geno­
type must be associated with a trait that is inheritable and that in­
creases the organism's reproductive success. In this case, the rapists 
would succeed reproductively while men who were otherwise geneti­
cally equivalent but who were not rapists would have failed at repro­
ducing. The long-term effect of this pattern of reproductive success on 
human demographics would thus have been the increasing frequency 
of the rapist type within the human population. 
When a trait evolves (or is "chosen") through natural selection, it 
is called an evolutionary adaptation. Thus, the primary hypothesis de­
fended in Thornhill and Palmer's book is that rape is an evolutionary 
adaptation - that it evolved because rape behavior itself was repro­
ductively superior to nonraping behavior. 
Under Thornhill and Palmer's second hypothesis, which they call 
the "byproduct" view, evolved psychological traits such as the male 
desire for a wide variety of mates led accidentally to the existence of 
rape, but rape itself was not directly selected. That is, the act of rape is 
an incidental byproduct of other male sexual adaptations, "especially 
those that function to produce the sexual desires of males for multiple 
partners without commitment" (p. 60). The phenomenon of evolu­
tionary "byproducts" is frequent in human evolution. Manual dexter­
ity, for example, was directly selected because it was reproductively 
advantageous to our ancestors for making tools, etc., and is therefore 
an adaptation. Our use of manual dexterity in playing the piano is a 
byproduct of the selection on manual dexterity. It is not an evolution­
ary adaptation itself. Note that selection leading to evolutionary adap­
tation is involved in this scenario, but the trait of playing the piano is 
distinct from the evolutionary adaptation itself; it is an epiphenome­
non. 
Thornhill and Palmer consider each of these hypotheses about the 
evolution of human rape - the hypothesis that rape is a specifically 
selected adaptation, and the hypothesis that rape is an evolutionary 
byproduct of selection on other traits. Most of their attention, how­
ever, centers on the rape-specific hypothesis. 
To buttress this hypothesis, Thornhill and Palmer propose a num­
ber of subsidiary psychological adaptations that would have increased 
men's chance of reproductive success when attempting to rape. Pro­
posed mechanisms include men having: (1) a special psychological ad­
aptation that enables them to evaluate females' vulnerability to rape 
(p. 66); (2) a special psychological adaptation to prefer to rape women 
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at peak fertility (p. 71); (3) a psychological adaptation to be sexually 
aroused by gaining physical control over an unwilling sexual partner 
(p. 75); ( 4) a psychological adaptation to rape wives and girlfriends if 
they believe their women are cheating on them (pp. 77-78); and fi­
nally, (5) a psychological adaptation for male paranoia about women's 
claims of being raped (p. 158). 
But under either evolutionary scenario women are also hypothe­
sized to have evolved rape-related adaptations - specifically, an ad­
aptation for psychological anguish upon being raped. The supposition 
is that rape victims suffer an overall loss in reproductive success. Psy­
chological anguish is thus hypothesized to have been an adaptation to 
help women guard against such reproductive loss. The psychological 
adaptation focuses the victim's attention on the causes of the loss and 
helps her avoid repetition of those causes (p. 85). The basic evolution­
ary assumptions here are that rape reduces a woman's reproductive 
success by circumventing her mate choice, that it reduces her mate's 
reproductive success by lowering his certainty of paternity, and that it 
reduces the fitness of the relatives of the victim and her mate (p. 85). 
In addition, reproductive losses could be expected from getting raped, 
insofar as the act causes physical injury, the loss of a victim's ability to 
use copulation as a means of obtaining material benefits from men, 
the interference with a victim's mate's protection of her, or a reduc­
tion in the quality or quantity of parental care given by her mate (p. 
86). 
According to Thornhill and Palmer, the adaptation of psychologi­
cal anguish manifests itself differently in different circumstances of 
rape. Women of peak reproductive age are hypothesized to experi­
ence more psychological pain than females of either pre- or post­
reproductive age (pp. 89-90). This is because the reproductive costs to 
these young women from getting raped are higher. 
In addition, Thornhill and Palmer predict that reproductive-age 
victims will experience more violent attacks than the pre- or post­
reproductive-age rape victims (pp. 91-92). The basis of this prediction 
lies in the hypothesis that reproductive-age women are more likely to 
fight back "because of the greater evolutionary historical cost to their 
reproductive success of being raped" (pp. 91-92), and that rapists 
would be more highly sexually motivated to complete the rape in re­
productive-age victims because of these victims' greater sexual attrac­
tiveness relative to victims in the other two categories (p. 92). 
Other hypothesized adaptations among females include: (1) the 
tendency to experience decreased psychological pain as the violence of 
the attack increases - this is because physical injury helps to prove to 
her mate that the sex really was forced and not consensual (p. 92); (2) 
"the absence of orgasm during rape" (p. 99); and (3) the tendency to 
avoid risky situations, especially during the fertile phase of her cycle 
(p. 100). 
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Thornhill and Palmer then use the supposed existence of female 
psychological rape adaptations to bolster their claims for specific male 
psychological rape-adaptations and to counter two alternatives to their 
theory. One would expect to find rape behavior to be ubiquitous in 
human societies, if it is genuinely adaptive for men; "women's appar­
ent adaptation to deal with rape . . .  implies that rape has been com­
mon enough in human evolutionary history to select for counter­
adaptations in women" (p. 57). This, they claim, refutes the alternative 
explanation that rape results from a low-frequency mutation, where a 
rape mutation would occur in the population, but would not be se­
lected either for or against. Such an explanation would imply that rape 
is not an evolutionary adaptation (p. 57). They also use the hypothe­
sized female adaptations against rape to argue that rape is not a re­
cently derived cultural anomaly generated by new circumstances in the 
human environment (p. 58). In other words, they use the supposed 
female adaptations against rape to rule out two possible alternatives to 
their two favored hypotheses. 
In sum, the authors focus their attention on what they present as 
the only two plausible candidates for the evolutionary explanation of 
rape: either it is an adaptation itself, or it is a byproduct of other as­
pects of evolved male sexuality. There is much more to be said re­
garding the evidence that they offer for this panoply of psychological 
adaptations to rape, both male and female, some of which I cover in 
Part III below. But first we must investigate the soundness of the en­
tire evolutionary framework within which the authors work. 
II. THE THEORY 
This Part examines Thornhill and Palmer's use of evolutionary bi­
ology. They begin by claiming that "selection is the most important 
cause of evolution," a contested, empirical claim (p. 8). What is evi­
dent from this bit of theoretical positioning is that Thornhill and 
Palmer are in the business of looking for explanations of traits in rela­
tion to the selective causes that produced them, thus ignoring the 
other four accepted forces of evolution - drift, mutation, recombina­
tion, and gene flow among groups in subdivided populations.7 Evolu­
tionary biologists standardly refer to strategies like Thornhill and 
Palmer's as "adaptationism," since such approaches seek to explain all 
interesting traits in terms of selective forces alone. In fact, Thornhill 
and Palmer equate an "ultimate or evolutionary analysis" with adapta­
tionism explicitly. They claim that the challenge for such an analysis is 
"to determine the nature of the selective pressure that is responsible 
for the trait. That selective pressure will be apparent in the functional 
7. See ELIZABETH A. LLOYD, THE STRUCTURE AND CONFIRMATION OF 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY (2d ed. 1994). 
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design of the adaptation" (p. 9). In other words, they want to infer in­
formation about the selection pressure from the "design" of a trait, 
and to assume that the only relevant evolutionary force shaping the 
trait was natural selection. . . 
This is not the way evolutionary analysis is typically done. First, 
Thornhill and Palmer simply assume that rape behavior constitutes a 
single, genuine trait. In fact, the standards of evolutionary biology re­
quire that they independently establish this assumption. To establish 
evolutionary traithood independently, the scientist must show that the 
trait has some distribution in the population and that is inherited. But 
establishing that rape is a single trait could perhaps be a problem be­
cause of its wide variety of types of occurrences - because, in other 
words, the majority of rape victims are babies, men, animals, post­
menopausal women, etc. 8 In addition, Thornhill and Palmer offer no 
studies of the inheritance of raping behavior. 
One also needs to show that the trait is an adaptation. There are a 
number of ways to do this. One is to look at existing genotypic and 
phenotypic9 variations in the current population of the trait: given that 
few men rape, there would seem to be ample evidence of variation 
from which to work. From this variation, the scientist can then com­
pare the differences in reproductive success between those exhibiting 
the trait and those not. If a positive reproductive advantage for those 
exhibiting the trait is found, then the evolutionist starts to look for the 
possible adaptive scenarios under which the trait could have evolved. 
Another important research avenue exists for establishing that a 
trait is an adaptation. Evolutionary biologists often compare the spe­
cies in question (in this case, human beings) with their closest relatives 
to see if the trait is manifested elsewhere in the lineage. This approach 
is not foolproof, but it does provide important information regarding 
when the trait might have evolved, and under what circumstances. If 
the trait is found to be an adaptation in closely related species, then it 
can be viewed with more confidence as an adaptation in human be­
ings. 
Finally, especially if the trait is not exhibited with any frequency in 
the closely related species, the scientist must examine the past evolu­
tionary circumstances of human beings very carefully for evidence that 
there was, indeed, a plausible set of circumstances under which the 
trait could have evolved. This would involve examination of past social 
structures, population sizes, migration rates, and material culture. 
These are the customary standards in evolutionary theory neces­
sary to demonstrate that a trait is an adaptation. Not all of these re-
8. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
9. The phenotype of an organism is the particular collection and arrangement of all its 
manifest physical traits. 
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search questions may be answerable, in which case the conclusion that 
a trait is an adaptation is correspondingly weakened. 
The fact that Thornhill and Palmer do not adhere to any of these 
standards of evidence was pointed out by Frans B.M. de Waal, a dis­
tinguished primatologist who works on evolutionary adaptations him­
self, in a review in The New York Times. As de Waal puts it: "for natu­
ral selection to favor rape, rapists would have to differ genetically 
from nonrapists and need to sow their seed more successfully . . .  
causing more pregnancies than nonrapists, or at least more than they 
would without raping. Not a shred of data for these two requirements 
is presented."10 
One of the ways that Thornhill and Palmer attempt to get around 
some of these evidentiary requirements is to claim that selection in the 
past has fixed the trait in the population, i.e., ·that all men (and 
women) now carry the genetic underpinnings that could lead to raping 
behavior (pp. 57, 80, 142, 194). This move - undefended as it is -
allows them to skip the potential evidentiary requirement of showing 
reproductive correlations between carrying the genetic underpinning 
and not carrying the genetic underpinning in the present population. 
But it does not relieve them of the other burdens of evidence listed 
above. In fact, nowhere in the book do the authors present evidence 
regarding either relevant details of the past evolutionary environment 
or comparisons with our closest relatives. Nor do they discuss seriously 
the possibility that rape itself is not a single trait. 
Moreover, despite their own warning that the trait of rape behav­
ior is not necessarily adaptive to current conditions, nearly all of the 
evidence they offer concerns precisely contemporary circumstances of 
rape (pp. 71-73, 88-89). This could be relevant evidence if they showed 
the relative reproductive success of rapists and nonrapists, but they do 
not. Thus, according to the usual evolutionary standards of evidence 
regarding demonstration that a trait is an adaptation, Thornhill and 
Palmer fail rather spectacularly. They begin by assuming that rape is a 
single trait, and that this trait is an adaptation, and they reason back­
wards from there. Needless to say, this undermines their repeated 
claims that they are doing good science. 
Thornhill and Palmer cite G.C. Williams's famous admonition that 
not all aspects of an organism are adaptations produced by natural 
selection, and that "adaptation is a special and onerous concept that 
should be used only where it is really necessary."11 And, in fact, even if 
one can show that a trait increases reproductive success, one cannot 
10. Frans B.M. de Waal, Survival of the Rapist, N.Y.TIMES, April 2, 2000, § 7, at 24. Pre­
sumably, de Waal intends for these requirements to be met at some point in evolutionary 
time. 
11. P. 9 (quoting GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION 4 
(1966)). 
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conclude that it is an adaptation, according to Williams. Williams re­
quires that, in order to show that a trait was designed by natural selec­
tion, one must show at least that a trait accomplishes its alleged func­
tion with "sufficient precision, economy,.and efficiency, etc." 1 2  This is 
a challenging requirement to meet in the case of human rape, consid­
ering that 29% of rape victims are ten years of age or under,13 that 
much rape involves oral or anal intercourse, that only 50% of males 
achieve ejaculation during vaginal rape,1 4  and that male-male rape 
makes up approximately 23% of rapes.15 
In order to avoid this difficult standard, Thornhill and Palmer ap­
peal to one of their most-cited authors, Donald Symons, who wrote 
The Evolution of Human Sexuality,16 and who, by the way, introduced 
a new low in "scientific" evidence by using Playboy magazine mail-in 
survey results to support some of his conclusions. 17 Symons's own in­
terpretation of Williams's strict requirement significantly softens the 
demand for evidence needed to show an adaptation. He says that 
Williams only requires that one "rule out chance as an adequate ex­
planation of [a trait's] existence." 1 8  Very few evolutionists would ac­
cept this as an adequate reading of Williams's book. 
Thornhill and Palmer demonstrate that they are not engaged in 
careful scientific analysis when they ignore all of this, instead claiming 
that one can rule out drift and mutation as forces in explanations of 
evolutionary history when a trait "shows evidence of functional de­
sign" (p. 10). But they make no mention of Sewall Wright's results to 
the contrary in population genetics,1 9  which clearly demonstrate the 
possibility of mutation and drift playing a major role in producing ad­
aptations, in his Shifting Balance theory. 
Thornhill and Palmer even misunderstand the role of mutation per 
se in evolution by claiming that "mutation, as an evolutionary cause 
for traits, may apply only to those traits that are only slightly above 
zero frequency in the population" (p. 10). In fact, this is true only for 
strongly deleterious traits; modem population genetics, in the so-
12. P. 10 (quoting WILLIAMS, supra note 11,  at 10). 
13. P. 72; DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL. FOR NAT'L VICTIM CENTER, RAPE IN 
AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION§ 1 (1992). 
14. P. 121; see Jerry A. Coyne, Of Vice and Men, NEW REPUBLIC, April 3, 2000 (re­
viewing RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: 
BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION (2000) ). 
15. A 1998 U.S. study showed that about 302,100 women and 92,700 men are raped each 
year nationwide. See Michael Ellison, The Men Can't Help It, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), 
January 25, 2000, at 4. 
16. DONALD SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SEXUALITY (1979). 
17. Id. at ch. 7. 
18. P. 10 (quoting SYMONS, supra note 16, at 11). 
19. Sewall Wright, Evolution in Mendelian Populations, 16 GENETICS 97 (1931). 
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called "neutral theory,"20 allows for much higher rates of mutation re­
tention in the absence of selection. 21 . 
One especially startling aspect of in Thornhill and Palmer's version 
of evolutionary theory is their claim that "the study of the profound 
implications of evolutionary theory - particularly the ability of selec­
tion to form adaptations - has, until recently, been relatively unex­
plored" (p. 106). Now, anyone who knows the history of evolutionary 
biology knows this is an incorrect statement. 22 This isjust part of the 
so-called evolutionary psychologists' valorization of themselves as 
starting a "new" movement in evolutionary biology. Thornhill and 
Palmer exhibit their identification of evolution with adaptation by 
evolution yet again by claiming that "the diversity of life has two ma­
jor components: adaptations and the effects of adaptations" (p. 11). 
This claim demonstrates their ignorance of the population genetics 
models showing the power of mutation and drift to shape life-forms 
and species. These oversights are not trivial. The authors' ignorance of 
the actual theory of evolution damages their credibility - especially in 
light of their repeated claims that they are experts in evolutionary the­
ory. 
Is it possible, though, that their ignorance of the actual workings of 
evolutionary theory has no real consequences for their overall line of 
reasoning? No, for they rely on these misunderstandings to eliminate 
alternative hypotheses regarding the evolution of rape. For example, 
they list four evolutionary causes of trait change or trait maintenance 
in evolutionary lines - selection, drift, gene flow, and mutation -
and end up discarding all but selection as a possible evolutionary cause 
of rape behavior (pp. 56-59). Th� most bizarre aspect of the little set of 
arguments that they use is that, despite their later acknowledgment 
that population geneticists are the experts in determining the balances 
and possibilities of those four causes (p. 106), they cite no population 
geneticists in their arguments that selection alone explains the exis­
tence of rape. Instead, they fabricate their own conclusions about the 
20. See MOTOO KIMURA, THE NEUTRAL THEORY OF MOLECULAR EVOLUTION 
(1983). 
21. Thornhill and Palmer make use of their mistaken view about mutation on p. 57, in 
the context of dismissing the hypothesis that rape could have arisen as a mutation balanced 
by selection. 
22. See, e.g., JENS CLAUSEN, STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF PLANT SPECIES (1951); 
CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Harvard Univ. Press 1964) (1859); 
THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY, GENETICS AND THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1937); VERNE 
GRANT, THE ORIGIN OF ADAPTATIONS (1963); DAVID LACK, THE NATURAL 
REGULATION OF ANIMAL NUMBERS (1954); ERNST MAYR, SYSTEMATICS AND THE ORIGIN 
OF SPECIES (1942); PHILLIP M. SHEPPARD, NATURAL SELECTION AND HEREDITY (1958); 
GEORGE G. SIMPSON, THE MAJOR FEATURES .OF EVOLUTION (1953); GEORGE L. 
STEBBINS, VARIATION AND EVOLUTION IN PLANTS (1950); Richard c. Lewontin, 
Dobzhansky's Genetics and the Origin of Species; ls it Still Relevant?, 147 GENETICS 351 
(1997); Wright, supra note 19. 
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likelihood of each cause, and then present their foregone conclusion: 
that only selection could have caused the propensity to rape. 
Return to Thornhill and Palmer's main fallacious conclusion: that 
"the diversity of life has two major components: adaptations and the 
effects of adaptations" (p. 11). Regarding "effects of adaptations," 
they give the useful example of the trait of the red color of human 
blood. This trait is a byproduct or epiphenomenon of the chemistry of 
oxygen and hemoglobin in the blood, plus the existence of human 
color vision. Byproducts or epiphenomena are not directly selected for 
their advantages to reproductive success, unlike real adaptations. 
Thornhill and Palmer make a contentious claim about these epi­
phenomena, namely, that they are always byproducts of adaptations 
for other things. This does not follow, and it is not the mainstream 
evolutionary view. For example, many traits categorized as evolution­
ary byproducts are understood as phylogenetic remnants, leftovers 
from the evolutionary ancestors of the species in question. But this 
does not mean that they ever were or were not under selection pres­
sure. Take the human trait of having five fingers on each hand. This 
trait traces to the beginnings of the vertebrate lineage. Some verte­
brates - horses, for example - endured selection pressure to change 
the number of phalanges, from five down to one for each limb. Other 
vertebrates underwent selection for grasping branches, reducing the 
number to four, and yet most vertebrates retain the five-digit limb. 
Now, does the fact that human beings customarily have five digits sig­
nify that there was selection for five and only five digits in human an­
cestry? The generally accepted evolutionary answer is "no." 23 Devia­
tions from the basic vertebrate body-plan of five digits are understood 
as having undergone mutation and selection for those mutations, while 
the default property of having five digits is not seen as having been di­
rectly selected in this case. This phenomenon is called "phylogenetic 
inertia,'' wherein a trait remains the same unless it is actively selected 
to change. This is true even in the deep evolutionary past, at the be­
ginnings of the vertebrate line, where having five rather than four dig­
its was perhaps an incidental side-effect of selection on other aspects 
of the vertebrate skeleton, or may well have been the only variant 
that, for other reasons, survived to found the lineage of vertebrates. 
Thornhill and Palmer hold a deviant' evolutionary view of the role 
of phylogenetic inertia in evolutionary explanations. They claim that 
phylogenetic inertia - or the difficulty of changing body plans and the 
resultant continuation of a trait in a lineage - is not an evolutionary 
explanation of anything, because it does not involve an evolutionary 
"cause" of the maintenance of a trait in a lineage of species. This is be­
cause the phylogenetic cause of a trait in a given species does not iden-
23. See STEPHEN J. GOULD, ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY (1977). 
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tify the "ultimate cause of the continuance" (p. 55). They use a clever 
example to bolster this view: the trait of the crossing over of the diges­
tive and respiratory tracts in (land) vertebrates. Here, they claim, the 
trait is maintained in all. relevant species through constant selection. 
Such a set-up, awkward and dangerous though it is, was necessary to 
maintain the digestive and respiratory functions through the history of 
vertebrates. And (land) vertebrates not conforming to the basic body 
plan would be nonviable, and would be selected against. Therefore, 
they conclude, "all evolutionary constraints and phylogenetic legacies 
ultimately involve selection in some way" (p. 56). But think: does this 
argument apply equally well to having five digits, a trait that just as 
likely was fixed in the phylogenetic past as an incidental correlate to a 
basically successful body plan? Of course not. 
Thus it is incorrect, according to modern evolutionary theory, to 
say that every trait is either an adaptation or an effect of an adaptation 
in the sense that Thornhill and Palmer use this dichotomy. And this 
mistake profoundly weakens Thornhill and Palmer's basic position, for 
they use this false dichotomy to set up a false choice: either rape is a 
specific adaptation, directly selected for in virtue of its superior repro­
ductive success, or it is a byproduct of other adaptations, an incidental 
side effect of special-purpose adaptations to circumstances other than 
rape. These two options are not, in fact, exhaustive. 
Having set up their supposedly exhaustive choice between a direct­
adaptation and a byproduct, they proceed to argue that very specific 
psychological adaptations should· be selected for in evolution. This dis­
cussion reveals their adherence to the scientifically undefended thesis 
- in fact, one contradicted by neurophysiological evidence24 - that 
the brain is constructed of a high number of very special-purpose 
physiological mechanisms. This view is a familiar hobby-horse of a 
group of authors calling themselves "evolutionary psychologists."25 
While on the topic, I should point out the exceedingly high density 
of references to this small group of authors in this book, who them­
selves engage in heavy cross-citation, and the fact that these authors 
are considered a fringe group by most evolutionary theorists. This 
group repeatedly demonstrates its narrow ·understanding of evolution­
ary theory itself, and its misinterpretations of some elements of mod­
ern evolutionary biology; and they rarely cite more mainstream evolu­
tionary theory or genetics, either contemporary or historical.26 
24. See D. Buller & F.G. Hardcastle, Evolutionary Psychology, Meet the Developing 
Brain: Combating Promiscuous Modularity, BRAIN AND MIND (forthcoming 2001). 
25. Pp. 15-20; see Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Evolutionary Psychology: The Burdens of Proof, 
14 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 211 (1999). 
26. E.A. Lloyd & M.W. Feldman, Evolutionary Psychology: A View from Evolutionary 
Biology, PSYCHOL. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2001). 
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At any rate, Thornhill and Palmer claim that we should expect 
human psychological adaptations to be special-purpose rather than 
general-purpose. This supposedly buttresses the rape-specific adapta­
tion hypothesis in the following way: the reproductive problems facing 
our human ancestors were very specific, therefore the mechanism, i.e., 
the tendency to rape itself, that "solved" these problems is also likely 
to be specific and not a byproduct of a more general adaptation, and 
thus favored by evolution. 
Other literature on the relations between human culture and psy­
chology and genetics in evolutionary biology is oddly missing from 
Thornhill and Palmer's book. Thornhill and Palmer ignore the careful, 
quantitative and theoretical work that has been done on the coevolu­
tion of genes and culture. 27 These authors concentrate on the mutual 
effects that genes and culture have had and can have on human evolu­
tion. Unlike Thornhill and Palmer, they do not see cultural and bio­
logical explanations as on the same level of explanation, nor do they 
attempt to reduce one to the other.28 While Thornhill and Palmer do 
appeal to one of these authors' works (once) (p. 27), conclusions in 
this section of their book aim toward showing that cultural research 
has no legitimate explanatory role outside of direct evolutionary con­
siderations. They approvingly quote Margo Wilson when she writes: 
"Darwinian selection is the only known source of the functional com­
plexity of living things, and biologists have no reason to suspect that 
there are any others."29 Contrary to this claim, the biologists working 
on gene-culture coevolution see culture as an important contributor to 
the evolved complexity of human beings. Nevertheless, Thornhill and 
Palmer maintain, "[t]he realization that culture is behavior places it 
clearly within the realm of biology, and hence within the explanatory 
realm of natural selection" (p. 25). But in contrast to Thornhill and 
Palmer, the above authors30 have shown that different explanatory 
levels are legitimate in evolutionary theory. 
27. E.g., ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND TIIE EVOLUTIONARY 
PROCESS (1985); L. L. CAVALLI-SFORZA & MARCUS W. FELDMAN, CULTURAL 
TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION (1981); WILLIAM H. DURHAM, COEVOLUTION: GENES, 
CULTURE AND HUMAN DIVERSITY (1991); L. L. Cavalli-Sforza & M.W. Feldman, Darwin­
ian Selection and "Altruism'', 14 THEORETICAL POPULATION BIOLOGY 268 (1978); Kevin N. 
Laland et al., Niche Construction, Biological Evolution, and Cultural Change, 23 BEHAV. & 
BRAIN SCI. 131 (2000); Kevin N. Laland et al., The Evolutionary Consequences of Niche 
Construction: A Theoretical Investigation Using Two-Locus Theory, 9 J. EVOLUTIONARY 
BIOLOGY 293 (1996); Richard C. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, and Environment, in 
EVOLUTION FROM MOLECULES TO MEN 273 (D.S. Bendall for Darwin College ed., 1983). 
28. Different "levels of explanation" appeal to different entities and laws, at distinct 
levels of the organization of life. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
29. P. 122 (quoting Margo Wilson et al., Femicide: An Evolutionary Psychological Per­
spective, in FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 431, 433 (Patricia A. Gowaty ed., 
1997)). 
30. See supra note 27. 
1548 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1536 
Ill. THE EVIDENCE 
This Part considers some of the specific evidence and arguments 
Thornhill and Palmer offer to support their various claims about evo­
lutionary adaptations, bearing in mind the usual evolutionary stan­
dards of evidence discussed previously. Overall, as Jerry Coyne and 
Andrew Berry pointed out in their review in Nature, at least three 
types of problems inhere in the evidence presented by Thornhill and 
Palmer: it "either fails to support their case, is presented in a mislead­
ing and/or biased way, or equally supports alternative explanations."31 
This Part reviews their samples of each problem and then moves on to 
other flaws. 
Coyne and Berry note that Thornhill and Palmer rely heavily on 
the claim that rape victims of reproductive age are strongly overrepre­
sented among rape victims to support their view that the rapists' evo­
lutionary agenda is reproductive in nature. But, Coyne and Berry 
point out, some data Thornhill and Palmer present actually contradict 
this claim. In a 1992 survey attempting to overcome the serious statis­
tical problem of unreported rapes, 29% of female U.S. rape victims 
were ten years of age and under (p. 72). Given that this age group 
comprises about 15% of the female population, nonreproductive age 
females were overrepresented by a factor of two in the set of rape vic­
tims.32 Clearly, the trait of raping under-age girls would not be adap­
tive, yet Thornhill and Palmer try to explain the statistics away by em­
phasizing that the data did not contain information regarding how 
many of these ten-and-under girls were exhibiting secondary sexual 
characteristics (p. 72). As Coyne and Berry note, this is a rather glar­
ing case of special pleading, which effectively undermines Thornhill 
31. Jerry A. Coyne & Andrew Berry, Rape as an Adaptation: Is this Contentious Hy­
pothesis Advocacy, Not Science?  404 NATURE· 121, 121 (2000) (reviewing RANDY 
THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF 
SEXUAL COERCION (2000)). Coyne is an evolutionary population geneticist in the Depart­
ment of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago, one of the strongest evolution­
ary biology departments in the world. Andrew Berry is an evolutionary geneticist and a Re­
search Associate at the Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard University, part of 
perhaps the most prestigious set of biological departments in the world. Nevertheless, in an 
astonishing reply, Thornhill reacted to the Coyne and Berry review saying, "[t]hese a'nti­
evolution critics don't like evolution applied to any feature of life, but especially not to hu­
man traits." Rape Theory Attacked; Evolutionary Basis Disputed, CINCINNATI POST, March 
9, 2000, at 3A (emphasis added). Generally, Thornhill believes that Coyne and Berry's op­
position to the book "is a scientifically invalid view. Therefore, it must be inspired by some 
ideology. We might as well have gotten our book reviewed by the pope." Richard 
Monastersky, Scientists Debunk the Idea that Evolution Makes Rapists, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Mar. 17, 2000, at A24 (reviewing RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A 
NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION (2000) ). 
32. Coyne & Berry, supra note 31, at 121. A 1998 U.S. study puts the rate of rape of girls 
twelve and under at 22%. Ellison, supra note 15. This is still approximately 150% of their 
representation in the population. 
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and Palmer's claim that they are actually trying to test their hypothe­
sis. 
Coyne and Berry also draw attention to a far more dramatic and 
deceptive use of evidence.33 Remember, Thornhill and Palmer claim 
that rape victims of reproductive age (age twelve to forty-four) are 
more traumatized by rape than females who are either too young (un­
der twelve) or too old (over forty-four) to reproduce (pp. 89-90). This 
apparent difference in the age classes supposedly supports their con­
tention that rape is essentially a reproductive act. But when Coyne 
and Berry checked the cited reference for this claim, they found a 
problem: the original work's conclusions differ crucially from those 
claimed by Thornhill and Palmer, despite the fact that Thornhill was 
one of the coauthors of the cited paper. The only real difference in 
rape victims' anguish is in the under-twelve class, who were recorded 
as experiencing much less trauma. The reproductive-age group and 
the over-forty-four group experienced equal amounts of trauma. Ap­
parently, in order to avoid a contradiction with their prediction, 
Thornhill and Palmer used a statistical sleight of hand. They pooled 
the statistic from the under-twelve and the .over-forty-four groups in 
order to have the reduced-trauma under-twelve group overwhelm the 
statistic from the forty-four-plus group. There are, indeed, lies, 
damned lies, and statistics. 
Coyne and Berry also criticized Thornhill and Palmer for ignoring 
the fact that some of their evidence equally supports alternative hy­
potheses. This actually occurs repeatedly, but the case picked out by 
Coyne and Berry is the claim that women of reproductive age experi­
ence more violence during rape than do older women and children, 
which is used by Thornhill and Palmer to suggest that they fight back 
harder because they have more reproductive fitness to defend. But, as 
Coyne and Berry point out, a parsimonious explanation of this fact is 
that women of reproductive age are physically stronger, and thus most 
capable of fighting back compared to girls or older women. Coyne and 
Berry remark, "[i]n exclusively championing their preferred explana­
tion of a phenomenon, even when it is less plausible than alternatives, 
the authors reveal their true colours. A Natural History of Rape is ad­
vocacy, not science."34 
Consider a few more examples of Thornhill and Palmer's handling 
of evidence and reasoning. Take their claim that rape is all and only 
about sexual reproduction - the club they use to batter the view of 
feminists who hold that rape is about both sex and domination or con­
trol of women. Thornhill and Palmer admit in passing that some hold­
ers of the byproduct view see rape as resulting fro� a combination of 
33. Coyne & Berry, supra note 31, at 122. 
34. Coyne & Berry, supra note 31, at 122. 
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male sexual desire and the "drive to possess and control."35· But they 
dismiss this very plausible evolutionary view by claiming that ordinar­
ily there is no drive to possess and control victims "for prolonged pe­
riods of time" (p. 62). But, of col,lrse, the period of time is irrelevant to 
whether that desire is a contributing proximate cause to rape. 
And what happened to the patently obvious hypothesis that raping 
behavior is due to psychopathology? In one of the two studies of de­
velopmental factors affecting rape that Thornhill and Palmer do dis­
cuss in the book, psychopathology played a leading explanatory role. 
This study of adolescent male sexual criminals36 found that rapists 
were characterized by backgrounds of repeated frustration, failed ro­
mantic and sexual relationships, as well as lower psychosocial func­
tioning, learning disabilities, and psychological disorders (p. 67). But 
Thornhill and Palmer want to treat psychopathic men as a group dis­
tinct from rapists, claiming (with no evidence) that psychopaths make 
up a distinct genetic form, and that normal men do not have the same 
adaptations.37 In fact, they suggest that "psychopathic and normal men 
possess two distinct psychological adaptations with regard to rape -
both of which could be condition dependent" (p. 82; emphasis added). 
Here is yet another candidate for special pleading. Interestingly, this 
resembles a similar problem that Thornhill and Palmer have with the 
fact that high-status men, who are otherwise able to secure sexual 
partners, rape, thus challenging their theory that only losers rape. In 
that case, they propose that "their raping must result from adaptations 
other than that suggested by the [low-status) hypothesis" (p. 68). Thus, 
we have two more specific psychological adaptations proposed in or­
der to deal with anomalies from the main rape adaptation theory, un­
der which the genetic underpinnings of rape were supposedly fixed 
among human beings. We can see an evasive tactic emerging: if ever 
an anomaly threatens Thornhill and Palmer's project, they simply 
propose more psychological adaptations. 
35. P. 61. The authors cite LEE ELLIS, THEORIES OF RAPE: INQUIRIES INTO THE 
CAUSES OF SEXUAL AGGRESSION (1989); Lee Ellis, The Drive to Possess and Control as a 
Motivation for Sexual Behavior: Applications to the Study of Rape, 30 Soc. SCI. INFO. 633 
(1991); and Neil M. Malamuth, The Confl.ue.nce Model of Sexual Aggression: Feminist and 
Evolutionary Perspectives, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT 269 (David M. Buss & Neil M. 
Malamuth eds., 1996). 
36. Aurelio J. Figueredo et al., A Brunswikian Evolutionary-Developmental Model of 
Adolescent Sex Offending, BEHAV. SCI. & L. 309 (2000). 
37. Geoffrey Miller, evolutionary psychologist at University College, London, also 
challenges Thornhill and Palmer's neglect of the psychopathology explanation: "psychopaths 
are discussed on only one page, though they account for a substantial proportion of all rap­
ists, and the majority of multiple rapists . . .  research shows there are heritable genetic differ­
ences in many traits that may predict the tendency to use sexual coercion, such as disagree­
ableness, psychoticism, low intelligence and a!Coholism." Geoffrey Miller, Why Men Rape, 
EVENING STANDARD, Mar. 6, 2000, at 53 (reviewing RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. 
PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION 
(2000)). 
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Yet another type of data is patently relevant to Thornhill and 
Palmer's hypotheses but is not considered: comparisons between hu­
man beings and our closest relatives, the chimpanzee and the bonobo. 
Thornhill and Palmer seem to have an internal conflict about whether 
to use comparative evidence, even though it is standard in contempo­
rary evolutionary analyses. In one place, they argue for the impor­
tance of comparative analysis, "which is a fundamental tool in biology 
for understanding causation" (p. 120). They follow this approach when 
they appeal to the claim that rape occurs in many nonhuman species, 
such as orangutans. But when it comes to our closest relatives, the 
standards change: they claim that it is erroneous to think that the be­
havior of nonhuman primates is necessarily salient to human adapta­
tions (p. 56). What motivates this sudden switch? Perhaps this: the rate 
of rape among chimpanzees is very low, and the majority of these are 
brother-sister rapes; moreover, rape has never been observed at all in 
bonobos.38 These are our two closest living relatives. This information 
clearly damages their case. It places extra burdens on them to produce 
a uniquely human account of the evolution of rape, one that does not 
rely on common traits about sex differences in sexuality that we share 
with our nearest relatives. Instead, Thornhill and Palmer rely heavily 
on comparative evidence from scorpionflies (pp. 63-64). 
Finally, perhaps the crucial assumption of their entire book is that 
rape is, indeed, a reproductively successful strategy - but they leave 
this assumption almost completely unsupported.· In fact, the current 
rape statistics seemingly undermine their conclusions. According to a 
study they cite themselves, the success rate that reported rapists cur­
rently have at inseminating their victims is only about 2%.39 Worse for 
Thornhill and Palmer, 50% of pregnant rape victims in a U.S. study 
terminated their pregnancy through therapeutic abortions, and an­
other 12% resulted in spontaneous abortion (p. 100). But Thornhill 
and Palmer are not deterred by these results. They dismiss objections 
to their views by stating that such contemporary evidence is not rele­
vant to whether rape was an adaptation in our ev9lutionary past.40 
38. Personal communication with Richard Wrangham, Harvard anthropologist. See 
JANE GOODALL, THE CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE (1986). Despite Thornhill and Palmer's 
approving citations of Wrangham and Dale Peterson's Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins 
of Human Violence, Wrangham notes there that feminists are. right in seeing rape as in­
volved with power relations, not just as a conceptive strategy. . . 
39. This 2% must be compared within the context of the overall lifetime reproductive 
success of those using the rape strategy, those not, and mixed cases. Even though Thornhill 
and Palmer do not compare these various strategies, it is still possible that a 2 % rate of in­
semination is strong enough to provide a selective pressure, even with high abortion rates. 
They need to show that raping provided, at some time in history, a higher frequency of fer­
tilization than non-raping for these individuals .. But they have not shown this. 
40. This, in spite of their heavy use of such contemporary evidence in other contexts. 
Nonetheless, the authors are certainly correct about this. 
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The problem is that Thornhill and Palmer make no effort to de­
scribe the relevant environmental (including cultural) circumstances in 
our evolutionary past in any detail, either in support of or against the 
rape hypotheses they consider. We would normally demand some evi­
dence regarding, for example: the percentage of women who either 
abort or kill their rape-begotten infants41; the likelihood that any given 
woman of reproductive age either is nursing (with its concomitant re­
duction in fertility) or is already pregnant at any given moment; or 
what percentage of rapists were caught and punished, which could be 
calibrated to the ancestral group size and the likelihood of being 
caught. But Thornhill and Palmer make no effort to provide this cru­
cial evidence, which is badly needed in order to evaluate their hy­
potheses. 
IV. THE ENEMY 
Thornhill and Palmer begin their chapter on "Law and Punish­
ment" with a caricature of social scientists, who supposedly believe in 
"cultural determinism." They claim: "Cultural determinism is consis­
tent with free will and with the ability of humans to change their be­
havior easily by adopting new social constructs" (p. 153; emphasis 
added). Needless to say, the "ease" of adopting new social constructs 
is an imaginative piece of misinterpretation by Thornhill and Palmer. 
Social scientists tend to view social and cultural forces as entrenched 
and as acting over the lifetime of the individual's development, and 
thus as very difficult to change. Hence, when Thornhill and Palmer 
point out that the "ease" of change "is in conflict with everything that 
is known about the interaction of genetic and environmental factors in 
the development of all behavioral abilities"(p. 153), they are in 
agreement, not opposition, with their supposed targets. They continue 
by stating that our real need is to understand "how human-mediated 
alterations in the developmental environment can produce desirable 
behavioral changes" (p. 153), thus stating the obvious, and outlining 
the standard goal of many sociological, criminal, and psychological 
studies. Thornhill and Palmer see their stated goals as conflicting with 
the social sciences only because they see evolutionary theory as "cru­
cial, since it predicts that the developmental events of interest will oc­
cur in response to specific cues that, in our history as a species, were 
most reliably correlated with reduced consensual sex with females" (p. 
154). But these specific cues are part of what the social scientists in 
question study. 
41. See SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: MATERNAL INSTINCTS AND How 
THEY SHAPE THE HUMAN SPECIES (1999), in which she argues for the prevalence of abor­
tion and infanticide in human evolutionary history. 
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Moreover, instead of including fair critical examination of various 
alternative hypotheses for the development of rape in men, Thornhill 
and Palmer attack a caricature of what they call the "feminist psycho­
social" position. They spend a full sixty pages of this slim 200-page 
book attacking feminist views on rape, which they inexplicably equate 
with "the social science theory." The feminist view supposedly says 
that sex has absolutely nothing to do with rape (the "not sex" view), 
and that rape is instead exclusively about the power and control over 
women, about misogyny, and about the exercise of patriarchal values. 
Their ultimate target for this view is Susan Brownmiller, who success­
fully inspired changes in the political and legal atmosphere surround­
ing treatment of rapists a1.1d victims with her 1975 book, Against Our 
Will.42 In Thornhill and Palmer's precis of their book, published in The 
Sciences, they wrote: 
In 1975 the feminist writer Susan Brownmiller asserted that rape is moti­
vated not by lust but by the urge to control and dominate. In the twenty­
five years since, Brownmiller's view has become mainstream. All men 
feel sexual desire, the theory goes, but not all men rape. Rape is viewed 
as an unnatural behavior that has nothing to do with sex, and one that 
has no corollary in the animal world.43 
But Brownmiller never professed the primary mistake attributed 
to her, namely, that rape does not involve sex. In fact, Brownmiller re­
fers to rape as a sexual act throughout the whole 1975 book. For ex­
ample, she calls rape "a 'taking' of sex through the use or threat of 
force."44 Elsewhere she recounts instances in which rape is a sexual 
reward for the male slave, and a sexual privilege for the masters.45 In 
other words, she clearly and repeatedly categorizes rape as sex. 
More recently, in an appearance on the National Public Radio 
show "Talk of the Nation" with Thornhill, Brownmiller insisted: 
I never said that rape was not involved with sex. Obviously, it uses the 
sex organs. What the women's movement did say, starting in the 1970s, 
was that rape was not sexy, you see. The men, up to that point, had ro­
manticized rape and always presented scenarios of · beautiful but just 
slightly unwilling, but really teasing victims. And the act was construed as 
sort of a Robin Hood act of machismo. When wo1,I1en started to speak up 
about their own experiences of rape, the first thing they said was, "No, 
there's nothing sexy about this. This was pure power humiliation, degra­
dation." And that's where the feminist theory came from, out of listening 
to the experiences of women.46 
42. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975). 
43. Randy Thornhill & Craig T. Palmer, Why Men Rape, SCIENCES, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 
30, 30. 
44. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 377. 
45. Id. at 157-58. 
46. Talk of the Nation (Nat'! Public Radio, Jan. 26, 2000) (emphasis added). 
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Thornhill expressed surprise during this radio show at Brownmil­
ler's statement that sex was involved in rape. 47 But this response was 
disingenuous at best, because Brownmiller had previously attempted 
to correct Thornhill's specific misrepresentation of the feminist view 
as the "not sex" view of rape. · She and Barbara Mehrhof were com­
mentators on a 1992 target article in Brain and Behavioral Sciences 
written by Thornhill and his former wife, Nancy Thornhill.48 In the 
commentary, Brownmiller and Mehrhof state, "[t]he central insight of 
the feminist theory of rape identifies the act as a crime of violence . . . .  
The sexual motivation, orgasmic release, is a secondary component. "4 9 
Why, then, does Thornhill now publicly feign surprise at 
Brownmiller's resistance to the former's characterization of her view 
as the "not sex" view? Perhaps because in their book, Thornhill and 
Palmer attribute to Brownmiller a series of straw person "arguments" 
that depend on her maintaining the "not sex" view. They then attempt 
to debunk these arguments. A closer look reveals that what they claim 
Brownmiller says differs from what Brownmiller actually said. 
Take Thornhill and Palmer's "Argument 9," supposedly put for­
ward by Brownmiller: "It is not a crime of lust but of violence and 
power . . .  rape victims are not only the 'lovely young blondes' of 
newspaper headlines - rapists strike children, the aged, the homely 
- all women" (p. 138). In elaborating their rebuttal to this claim, 
Thornhill and Palmer focus on the ages of rape victims and argue: 
The statement that "any female may become a victim of rape" 
(Brownmiller 1974, p. 348) does not imply that the "rapist chooses his 
victim with a striking disregard for conventional 'sex appeal' " (ibid., p. 
338). Contrary to Brownmiller, although any female might become a vic­
tim of rape, some women are far more likely to become victims of rape 
than others. Indeed, one of the most consistent finding [sic] of studies on 
rape, and one not likely to be due entirely to reporting bias, is that 
women in their teens and their early twenties are highly overrepresented 
among rape victims around the world.50 
Now consider what Brownmiller actually said on the pages quoted. 
On the same page as the second sentence they quote, Brownmiller 
writes: 
Statistical probability does matter. Just as there is a calculable "typical" 
rapist, there is also, to a lesser degree of certainty, a "typical" victim. 
While any woman is a natural target for a would-be rapist, the chances 
47. Id. (Thornhill to Brownmiller: "And that you're saying now that rape is sex and so 
forth is kind of amazing"). · 
48. Randy Thornhill & Nancy W. Thornhill, The Evolutionary Psychology of Men 's Co­
ercive Sexuality, 15 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 363 (1992). 
49. Susan Brownmiller & Barbara Mehrhof, A Feminist Response to Rape as an Adap­
tation in Men, 15(2) BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 381, 382 (1992). 
50. Pp. 138-39. 
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are that a rape victim will be of the same class and race as her attacker, at 
least between 70 and 90 percent of the time. More often than not, she 
also will be approximately the same age as her attacker, or slightly 
younger. Overall, the danger to women is greatest between the ages of 10 
and 29. Teenage girls, simply by being teenage girls, run the greatest risk 
of any ag� group.51 
In other words, Brownmiller explicitly denies that all women are 
equally likely to become rape victims, and in fact emphasizes the same 
results as Thornhill and Palmer, in direct contradiction to their charge. 
In all, four of the nine "feminist" arguments they attempt to debunk 
are attributed to Brownmiller, so it is significant that the textual evi­
dence and the verbal reports of that author deny the basic premise of 
these arguments, namely, that sex is not involved in rape. Further dif­
ficulties abound. Feminist "Argument 1" consists of a quote taken 
from opponents to a feminist understanding of rape (p. 133). Ordinar­
ily, honest scientists consider versions of arguments from their propo­
nents and not their proponents' enemies. This is not the only time, 
however, that Thornhill and Palmer use the tactic of representing their 
�nemies' views unfairly. For example, they also use antifeminist 
Dwight D. Murphey,5 2 who presents a popular press version of 
Brownmiller's view of rape that misrepresents her position as a "not 
sex" view (p. 125). In sum, Thornhill and Palmer must be considered 
unreliable on the issue of what feminists have said, and how it relates 
to their own views. 
· 
Now consider the following argument: all matter is subject to the 
laws of quantum mechanics and relativity theory. Therefore, popula­
tion geneticists cannot have a legitimate explanation of the behavior 
of genes, because they fail to appeal to the fundamental causes of mat­
ter's behavior.53 This amounts to a denial of the legitimacy of an inde­
pendent level of explanation for a non-"fundamental" theory. 
Implausibly, Thornhill and Palmer use the same form of argument 
in this book, wherein they reject higher, independent levels of expla­
nation above the ordinary biological level as not being fundamental 
enough. This argument is unacceptable regarding population genetics, 
and it is unacceptable concerning the social science levels of explana­
tion that Thornhill and Palmer want to delegitimate. 
One of the most confused and confusing aspects of Thornhill and 
Palmer's arguments is the claim that "every aspect of every living 
thing is, by definition, biological" (p. 20). Their argument runs as fol­
lows. All behavior is biological because it evolved. Therefore all ex-
51.  BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 348. 
52. Dwight D. Murphey, Feminism and Rape, 17 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 13 (1992). 
53. This example is due to Michael Dickson, History and Philosophy of Science De­
partment, Indiana University. 
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planations of that behavior must · be biological, since there is no psy­
chological, sociological, or cultural explanation that is not fundamen­
tally biology. Therefore, all research into behavior must involve and 
be guided by evolutionary biology. As they put it, culture is "still bio­
logical and subject to the only general biological theory - evolution 
by selection" (p. 24). (Never mind the false equation of evolutionary 
theory itself with evolution by selection.) 
Shockingly, this line of argument is supposed to show that social 
scientists such as psychologists and sociologists cannot do their re­
search - investigating and identifying the range of environmental fac­
tors influencing behavior - without doing evolutionary biology simul­
taneously.5 4 Of course, it implies nothing of the kind: the search for 
environmental factors affecting phenotypes can proceed in the com­
plete absence of a specific evolutionary hypothesis. Furthermore, 
having an evolutionary hypothesis about a trait does not by any means 
isolate the relevant learning factors that go into producing that trait. 
Both of these points ate denied vehemently by Thornhill and Palmer 
(pp. 84, 153, 156). 
. 
Note how the apparently trivial claim that "everything is biologi­
cal" is now doing real work here. They want to claim that someone not 
using the evolutionary level of explanation for a human phenomenon 
offers no explanation at all. But even according to their own view, re­
search into the relevant causes of different developmental outcomes in 
human beings is a necessary part of the explaining that they want to 
do. If some of the relevant causes are cultural, then cultural research 
into such causes is totally legitimate, and in fact necessary. Or do they 
want to rule out cultural causes as possible influences on human de­
velopment? Apparently not, for they say, "[y]es, some differences in 
behavior between individuals could be due entirely to cultural influ­
ences that have affected their behavior" (pp. 24-25). But this does not 
mean, they say, that "an individual's culturally influenced behavior is 
due entirely to environmental causes and hence is not biological" (p. 
25). But they have just admitted that, in the case at hand, the differ­
ences between one individual and another can be entirely cultural, and 
not explicable at the level of biology. 
And therein lies the rub. They want to deny that cultural explana­
tions can really explain anything - that the cultural level of investiga­
tion is a legitimately explanatory one. On what basis? On the basis 
that "an individual's cultural behavior is still a product of gene­
environment interactions. And the individual can learn nothing with-
54. In criticizing social scientists, Thornhill and Palmer actually claim that evolved cog­
nition itself may interfere with evolutionary investigation into cultural phenomena: 
"Evolved psychological intuitions about behavioral causation can mislead individuals into 
believing that they know a� much as experts do about proximate human motivation." P. 114 
(emphasis added). The experts on social behavior here seem to be the evolutionists, rather 
than the social scientists. 
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out underlying adaptation for learning" (p. 25). We can agree to these 
last statements and yet believe that a purely cultural investigation of 
individual differences in development is both necessary and explana­
tory. Nevertheless, Thornhill and Palmer insist that "[t]he cultural be­
havior of individuals is never independent of the human evolutionary 
history of selection for individual reproductive success" (p. 29). What 
they mean by "independent" here is explanatory independence, as be­
comes painfully obvious in their fierce attack on the possibility of the 
social sciences telling us anything useful about human rape. But they 
have not successfully argued for explanatory dependence of the social 
on the biological. At best, they have argued the reverse, with their 
own admission of the explanatory power of cultural explanation of dif­
ference. 
V. LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 
Thornhill and Palmer repeatedly promise that.moving to the evo­
lutionary level of explanation will make everything better: therapeutic 
treatment of rape victims; reduction in the incidence of rape; im­
provements in how rape is treated in the courts; and understanding of 
the developmental, social, and cultural "conditional" factors produc­
ing rapists from male babies (pp. 82, 84, 97, 114, 153, 154, 156, 158, 
187). Despite this repetition, they offer no evidence whatsoever for 
any of these claims; all we get are promises. But they do offer a few 
concrete remarks, well supported or not, concerning the legal treat­
ment of rapists. They also suggest ways to improve rape prevention 
training. 
As Thornhill and Palmer acknowledge, people have a strong ten­
dency to react to their theories by_ indulging in what is known as the 
"naturalistic fallacy": equating claims of what is "n_atural" with claims 
of what is "good" or morally defensible. Since the authors do not con­
done rape, they attempt to deter this reaction repeatedly. But their 
eagerness to publish a poorly supported and inflammatory theory -
one that predictably evokes the natu�alistic fallacy - seems irrespon­
sible. Most published editorials and letters to the ed�tor invoking these 
authors commit precisely this fallacy. Accusing people of a "lack of 
scholarship" just is not good enough (p. 122). 
They respond to the naturalist fallacy as follows: "Contrary to the 
common view that an evolutionary explanation for human behavior 
removes individuals' responsibility for their actions, individuals who 
really understood the evolutionary bases of their actions might be bet­
ter able to avoid behaving in an 'adaptive' fashion that is damaging to 
others" (p. 154). Now specifically how is this knowledge supposed to 
help change the rapist's behavior? Do they have evidence that such 
knowledge would be connected with a lower incidence of rape? Is this 
even plausible? They propose a rape-prevention education program 
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for teenage boys - one that could perhaps be required before they 
get their driver's licenses -'-- which involves explaining the evolution­
ary basis of their sexual desires, and which encourages them to control 
their sexual impulses (p. 179). (And these are the authors who criti­
cized the sociologists for believing that behavior can easily be 
changed!) After such an education, they suggest, "refusal to refrain 
from damaging behavior in the face of scientific understanding could 
be seen as a ground for holding irresponsible individuals more culpa­
ble, not less so" (p. 154). 
This suggestion raises a host of questions. For instance: since they 
emphasize that evolutionary theory is very complicated and difficult, 
how are they planning to teach it in this mini-course?55 Also, since they 
know that most people's reaction to their view is to commit the natu­
ralistic fallacy, why assume that the instructees (or their instructors) 
would be any different, and would not also conclude that rape is natu­
ral, and therefore inevitable or acceptable? They do emphasize that 
teaching that the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy will be part of their 
suggested course (pp. 179-180), but can we assume that it will be un­
derstood? 
One striking thing about Thornhill and Palmer's discussion of rape 
prevention and punishment is how many of their ideas are borrowed 
directly from the feminist accounts they deride. For instance, they note 
that "rape has traditionally been defined and punished not from the 
victim's perspective but from a male perspective, and particularly from 
the perspective of the victim's mate."56 They also note that rules and 
laws generally serve the interests of the powerful - for example, men 
as opposed to women.57 Furthermore, statutory rape laws should be 
understood in the context that, in most societies, "daughters have 
been viewed as their father's property."'5 8  As far as rape prevention 
goes, their suggestions are nearly- all features thathave been central to 
the feminist revolution in rape counseling: advising caution about 
having men and women alone in isolated places; advocating self­
defense training; urging women to exert greater control over circum­
stances "in which they consent to be alone with men" (p. 186). They 
differ from feminist advice in their recommendation that women wear 
more concealing clothing (even though they offer no evidence of a 
correlation between the amount of skin shown and rape). But 
Thornhill and Palmer claim that all this follows only from the evolu-
55. Thornhill himself argued in a radio appearance: "(Y]ou know, evolutionary biology 
is complex. Science is complex. In fact, many have pointed out that the facts and theory of 
evolution are the qiqst complex set of ideas we have out there . . . .  " Talk of the Nation (Nat'! 
Public Radio, Jai;i. 2�, 2000). 
56. Pp. 154-55; cf. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 14, 18-30, 376-77. 
57. P. 162; cf. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 17. 
58. P. 162; cf. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 17-18, 376. 
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tionary perspective, and that only the evolutionary perspective can 
help direct research towards treatment that will alleviate the pain and 
suffering caused by rape (pp. 187-88). 
As far as legal punishment goes, Thornhill and Palmer do not pro­
pose a specific program; they simply claim that any such program of 
punishment should be informed by what is known about evolution. 
They do discuss one possible punishment in detail, though - chemical 
castration. They defend chemical castration on the basis of evolution, 
claiming that since rape is about reproductive sex, chemical castration 
might be an effective preventative.5 9 They fail .to address the problem, 
however, that such an approach has a good chance of reducing the 
conviction rate of rapists, since juries may be more reluctant to inter­
fere with the suspect's "manhood" than they are to sending him to 
prison for a few years. 
All told, this book contains little information of specific interest to 
lawyers, beyond this discussion of chemical castration and the constant 
preaching about how an evolutionary approach is necessary to under­
standing rape. Thornhill and Palmer's recommendations for rape pre­
vention - with the exception of the driver's ed class - are not new. 
The only thing really new here is that they urge both lawyers and lay 
people alike to see rape as purely a sexual act, proximally motivated 
by an out-of-control male libido. Of course, that view is not really new 
either; in fact, it is rather old-fashioned. The public and lawyers alike 
must decide if this reduced view of rape as sex alone really represents 
the truth about rape. Based on the weaknesses in their evolutionary 
biology alone, I think the answer is clear. When the data-fudging and 
gross misrepresentation of other explanatory approaches are added to 
the mix, I take it to be the responsibility of educated people to resist 
Thornhill and Palmer's conclusions about rape. In fact, the only cir­
cumstance under which I think this book should be read is one in 
which a prosecutor is faced with a defendant's lawyer who plans to call 
one of these authors or their followers to the stand. In that case, the 
attorney should read the book, then go out and hire a real evolution­
ary biologist as an expert witness. 
59. Pp. 165-66. According to Dani Robbins Zulich, director of the Women's Coalition at 
Case Western Reserve University, experiments in treating rapists with surgical and chemical 
castration have not proven effective. See Karen Sandstrom, Study of Rape Hits Ideological 
Wall; Linking Cause to Evolution Ignites Backlash, In Review of Thornhill and Palmer, 
PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 27, 2000, at 1 11. 
